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Federal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era
Roger G. No!!, Stanford University
Executive Summary
The President's budget proposals for fiscal 2003 envision that government R&
D will play a substantial role in the War on Terrorism. The antiterrorism initia-
tive could have two effects: to shift significant R&D resources to projects to
fight terrorism, and to reconstitute the broad bipartisan coalition favoring all
forms of R&D that has substantially weakened since the end of the Cold War.
In practice, the President's budget proposals do not indicate either effect. The
amount allocated for antiterrorist activities is minuscule, and the President's
budget continues a long trend of rapid growth in biomedical research and stag-
nation or decline in nearly every other category.
I.Introduction
This chapter examines federal spending on research and development
(R&D), and asks whether the recent antiterrorism fervor is likely to
cause a substantial increase in R&D spending during the next few
years. This question is potentially significant for two reasons. First, U.S.
R&D is important for long-term economic growth throughout the
world. From the perspective of the U.S., Federal R&D policy is impor-
tant because U.S. economic growth depends on continued productivity
advances and, especially, the health of American high-tech industries.
For the rest of the world, U.S. R&D is important because the U.S. is by
far the world's leader in R&D and technological progress, and im-
provements in U.S. technology tend to spread to other nations because
technological progress tends not to respect political boundaries. Sec-
ond, in the past, major long-term changes in national security priorities
have had a major effect on Federal R&D spending that lasted for a
decade or more. In general, the perception of a new threat to U.S. na-
tional security (e.g., the Cold War) has led to increased R&D budgets,62 Noll
while substantial involvement by the U.S. in military conflicts (e.g.,
Vietnam) has led to reduced R&D spending.
A substantial federal role in R&D has a long history, staring early
in the nineteenth century. Since World War II, the U.S. government
has been the world's most important single source of R&D spending.
The fiscal 2003 budget continues this policy. The present (Bush II) ad-
ministration proposes to spend $112 billion on R&D in FY 2003, which
is likely to exceed total public and private R&D spending in any other
country (the closest is Japan at around $100 billion) and to account for
roughly 40% of the total U.S. R&D effort.' The results of this R&D can-
not be confined solely to the U.S., but will affect the technology base
of industries throughout the world. Consequently, the decisions of the
Federal government regarding its R&D budget could have a substantial
effect on the growth of knowledge and technical know-how not only
in the U.S., but in the entire world.
The events of the fall of 2001 led to an intensification of interest in
R&D to deal with terrorist threats. The FY 2003 budget devotes two
chapters to antiterrorist programs, one under the rubric of "homeland
security" and the other dealing with international aspects of the war
on terrorism.' The R&D component of the budget also "focuses on win-
fling the war against terrorism," including programs "to improve de-
tection of biological and chemical threats ...and...to improve
aviation security technology." Whether this budget emphasis is dura-
ble remains uncertain; however, if the new emphasis does usher in a
new era of greater federal R&D spending, the remaining issues are
whether these initiatives will be successful, how other parts of the fed-
eral R&D budget will be affected, and what effect these changes are
likely to have on overall R&D effort, technological progress, and eco-
nomic growth.
The key conclusions of this chapter are as follows. First, although
the connection of antiterrorism with R&D thus far appears tenuous, if
past experience is repeated defense-related R&D expenditures are
likely to be substantially larger and to grow faster in the next few years
than in the 1990s. Second, increased expenditures on defense-related
R&D are not likely to cause a long-term reduction in other R&D. In-
deed, most likely increased defense-related R&D will cause other gov-
ernment R&D to increase, not to decline, although this effect may be
delayed for a few years. Third, the effect of these changes on technolog-
ical progress and economic growth depends on whether other sources
of R&D support will continue to grow, and while these expendituresFederal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 63
are difficult to predict, there is danger that at least in some areas fed-
eral R&D will substitute for private spending. Fourth, if non-federal
sources of R&D expenditures do continue to grow, within a few years
the U.S. is likely to face a serious supply bottleneck in R&D, arising
from the declining ability of the U.S. educational sector to produce
well-trained scientists and engineers. Without attending to this prob-
lem, much of the increase in R&D spending is likely to be dissipated
in increases in R&D costs, rather than increases in R&D output. If so,
greater spending on R&D is unlikely to increase the rate of technologi-
cal progress, and could reduce it if, as seems plausible, a disproportion-
ate amount of increased spending is focused on areas of R&D with
low payoff. The remainder of this essay provides the basis for these
conclusions.
II.The Basic Economics of Government R&D Programs
A great deal of useful research has been undertaken on the question
of whether the government can play a beneficial role in supporting
research and development. A necessary place to start in assessing the
likely consequences of plausible near-term changes in federal R&D pol-
icy is a review of the arguments in favor of a strong federal role, as
well as the cautionary arguments about why government may not be
able to succeed very well if it seeks to fill this role.
R&D Market Failures
The case for a strong federal role in supporting R&D is derived from
two arguments: that R&D is an important source of economic growth,
and that other sectors of the economy are not likely to undertake either
as much R&D as is justified by its economic return to society, or the
right balance of R&D across industries or between more fundamental
and applied projects.4
The purpose of R&D is to produce useful new knowledge. A major
area of economics research since the mid-twentieth century has been to
measure the contribution of advancements in knowledge to economic
growth. The consensus view is that half or more of the growth in per
capita income in developed countries arises from advances in
knowledge.5
Once new knowledge is produced, keeping it secret for the purpose
of capturing all of the gains from its useful applications is both difficult64 Noll
and inefficient. Keeping new knowledge secret is inefficient because,
once it is discovered, giving others access to it for the purpose of im-
proving their own productivity usually is far cheaper than the cost of
discovering (or independently rediscovering) it. And secrecy is difficult
because successful commercial applications of the knowledge are likely
to reveal some of the secrets to competitors. Moreover, if discoverers
require financial capital from others to develop and produce applica-
tions, in the process of convincing potential investors to provide finan-
cial capital, the discoverer must reveal some of the secrets, thereby
risking loss of control of the new knowledge. For this reason, firms are
very reluctant to contract with other firms to perform R&D activities.6
If innovators .face considerable difficulties in keeping useful new
knowledge to themselves, the beneficiaries of their new knowledge in-
dude competitors, producers in other industries, and consumers who
do not pay for all of the R&D that made these benefits possible. Empiri-
cal researchers have not yet achieved consensus on the magnitude of
these spillover benefits (i.e., benefits to someone other than the innova-
tor) from.private R&D, but nearly all work finds that they are substan-
tial, ranging. from 25% to 75% of the total social benefits of R&D
activities.7
If those who pay for R&D do not capture all of its benefits, too little
R&D is likely to be undertaken by the private sector. For-profit firms
will not undertake as much R&D as is socially desirable, because some
of the profitability of firm-supported R&D will be dissipated by infor-
mation leakage. Moreover, because spillovers do not respect political
boundaries, lower levels of government will have an inadequate incen-
tive to support research because some beneficiaries will live outside
their jurisdictions.8
The degree to which spillover effects are important is likely to differ
considerably across types of R&D projects. For example, intellectual
property rights are much stronger in some technologies (e.g., pharma-
ceuticals) than in others (e.g., mechanical devices), implying that the
disincentive to invest in R&D is likely to differ among industries. In
most cases, advances in fundamental scientific knowledge cannot be
protected by intellectual property rights, implying relative under-
investment in fundamental research in comparison with commercial
products. These differences in the potential significance of uncontrolled
spillovers imply that if the government seeks to encourage more
R&D to offset the spillover problem, it cannot adopt a simple, across-
the-board policy of subsidizing all R&D equally. Instead, it must varyFederal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 65
the magnitude of the subsidy according to the nature of the R&D
project.
Informational problems give rise to a second rationale for public sup-
port for commercial R&D, which is to improve efficiency in the market
for investments in R&D-intensive firms (especially small startups).9 The
basic problem here is that people with innovative ideas may lack fi-
nancial capital to undertake the R&D necessary to commercialize their
innovation, whereas those with funds available for investments may
be uninformed about these ideas. Venture capitalists can overcome this
disadvantage only by devoting time and resources to learning about
new technical ideasin essence, by doing researchbut innovators
may be reluctant to assist them in gaining this knowledge out of fear
that potential investors may steal their ideas.
The government can attack these potential failures in the capital mar-
ket by creating programs to investigate new ideas and then to invest
modest amounts in the best ones. Presumably innovators are less fear-
ful that government bureaucrats will steal their inventions, and so will
be more willing to share their ideas through a grant application. Ven-
ture capitalists can then use the assessments by government officials,
as revealed by their grant decisions, as information aboutwhich firms
have the best ideas and therefore offer the most attractive investment
possibilities. In this case, the main value of the award to a firm may
not be the cash received from the govermnent, but the effect of having
been given an award on the ease with which the firm can attract private
investments. Of course, the validity of this argument depends on
whether government agencies have the capability and incentive to
identify technical ideas that venture capitalists will find attractive,
which, for reasons discussed below, may not be the case.
A third rationale for government R&D arises from the market power
of the federal government as a purchaser of some products. For exam-
ple, the U.S. government is, by far, the largest purchaser of many de-
fense products. Moreover, for defense products that are invented and
produced by U.S. companies, whether the product can be sold else-
where also is decided unilaterally by the U.S. government. Conse-
quently, the U.S. government has considerable market power in
acquiring many defense goods, such as major weapons systems.
If the federal government did not support private R&D in the
defense sector, firms might not be willing to undertake much R&D
on their own. The reason is that, once a major innovation is at hand,
the government can exercise its market power by forcing down the66 Noll
price to the cost of production, without an adequate margin to recover
preproduction R&D. Moreover, because the government is the sole
purchaser of many defense systems, the success of a weapons system
in the market depends on whether it serves the performance objec-
tives of the government, which the government is likely to know
with greater precision than any potential supplier. Hence, if the gov-
ernment controls R&D activity, it is more likely to get the products it
wants. For these reasons, it is hard to imagine that the government
would not play a central role in supporting R&D in defense, space,
and other areas where it is overwhelmingly the dominant source of
demand.
The final rationale for government R&D pertains to externalities
activities in which market incentives do not reflect all the social benefits
and costs of an activity, even if the knowledge arising from their dis-
covery can be retained by the irmovator. An example is environmental
pollution. Firms and consumers have little incentive to control their
pollution unless government imposes regulatory requirements. If regu-
latory rules are based in part on the cost of abatement, polluting firms
can expect that successful R&D on abatement methods will lead to
more rigorous abatement requirements. As a result, polluting firms do
not have an incentive to invent technologies that reduce pollution be-
yond the level required by regulation.
Whereas other firms may have an incentive to invent abatement tech-
nology in hopes that regulators will then force polluters to use it, this
effect is not likely to offset the first disincentive, for two reasons. First,
polluting firms are likely to know more about their production technol-
ogy and product design than other firms, and so to face lower costs of
inventing new abatement methods. Second, for abatement technology
to succeed in the market, it first must be approved by regulators in a
process in which the potential customers of the technology are likely to
oppose its adoption, which is an additional costly step in the innovative
process.1° Thus, the pace of innovation to deal with externalities like
pollution is likely to be slower than is socially optimal.
Problems with Government R&D Programs
The preceding arguments are based on the idealistic assumption that
government seeks to correct inefficiencies that arise in markets, that it
possesses the information necessary to determine how to correct these
market failures, and that it can be effective in increasing total R&DFederal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 67
effort. Several cautionary observations about government-sponsored
R&D question these assumptions.
Crowding Out One potential difficulty with government-sponsored
R&D is that government dollars will simply substitute for private dol-
lars as the source of support for R&D projects. The economics research
literature generally supports the idea that this crowding out effect is
present in some but not all cases.1' Crowding out can arise for three
reasons.
Labor supply constraints: If the economy is at full employment and all
scientists and engineers are already fully employed in R&D activities,
an increase in government R&D effort will redirect R&D into areas of
lower private profitability but will not succeed in increasing overall
R&D effort. Instead, the increase will cause higher wages of technical
personnel and higher costs for R&D projects.'2 In principle, the shift in
the composition of R&D could favor projects that have higher social
productivity (taking into account benefits that do not accrue to the en-
tity undertaking the R&D), but it will not solve the problem of general
underinvestment in the search for new knowledge.
Eventually this effect can be eliminated if higher wages for technical
personnel cause more people to become trained as scientists and engi-
neers and then to seek employment in R&D activities. But an adequate
response in the supply of technically trained workers is by no means
assured. To begin, a labor supply response to rising wages is expensive
and time-consuming because it requires substantial education. People
are unlikely to switch career plans unless they believe that job pros-
pects in technical fields have become permanently more attractive,
rather than simply reflecting a temporary boom in pursuit of a transient
priority. For example, people picking a career in 1950 plausibly were
more likely to believe in the durability of the Cold War as a source of
demand for R&D than contemporary young workers regard the dura-
bility of the antiterrorism crusade. Thus, the supply response is likely
to be very protracted.
Even if labor supply does respond to growth in wages, the response
is not likely to be adequate from a societal perspective. If investments
in R&D provide economic benefits that exceed the returns to R&D in-
vestments, R&D workers in the private sector will be paid less than
the value of their economic contribution to society. If other occupations
generally have lower spillover effects, their workers will be paid wages
that more nearly parallel their social productivity, and as a result the68 Noll
wage signals to prospective workers will induce too few people to pick
a career in R&D. One can induce an adequate supply of R&D workers
by only two means: subsidizing private R&D or subsidizing the train-
ing of R&D workers, such as by paying for their educational
preparation.
In fact, the relative wages of college graduates in general and of tech-
nically educated workers, in particular, have risen significantly during
the past twenty years.'3 As a result, the fraction of young adults who
are enrolled in higher education has grown steadily. Yet the number of
students with technical education is not increasing, due to still another
barrier to a long-term response in labor supply.
A significant increase in technically trained workers requires that
those who train scientists and engineers must expand their enrollment
capacity. In practice, the ability to train more scientists and engineers
is severely limited. To respond to growth in the demand for technical
workers, students must receive adequate education in mathematics,
science, and engineering, begirming in elementary schools and continu-
ing through college. The poor performance of most American elemen-
tary and secondary schools in these areas has been a matter of public
debate (but little effective action) for two decades. Because other na-
tions, including some developing countries such as China and India,
have generally done a better job in elementary and secondary educa-
tion, an increasing fraction of science and engineering students in
American higher education and new workers in American high-tech-
nology industries are foreign.14
While importing qualified foreigners has proved to be an important
source of technical personnel, bottlenecks in science and engineering
education among colleges and universities remain an additional bar-
rier. American colleges and universities are the world's leaders in pro-
ducing high-quality scientists and engineers, which explains why so
many superb foreign students seek their higher education in the U.S.
In Europe, enrollments in higher education have increased, but at the
expense of educational quality, while developing countries lack the re-
sources to train more than a relatively low proportion of their college-
age students."
In the U.S., most scientists and engineers are trained in public univer-
sities and colleges that are financed by state and local governments.
As in Europe, these institutions have experienced growing enrollments
in the face of declining real budgets, but they have responded some-
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ments in technical fields, but instead have responded to the scarcity
of financial resources for expanding faculty and laboratoryspace in
technical fields primarily by rationing positions and raising prices (tu-
ition and fees minus financial aid).16 By the 1990s, the number of under-
graduates who wanted to major in science and engineeringwas
roughly 50% larger than the number accommodated.'7 Thus, increasing
the number of high school graduates, domestic or foreign, who qualify
for technical degree programs could simply increase the number of
students who, once they reach college, are diverted into other fields
that contribute less to economic growth but that are less costly to teach.
The implication of the preceding analysis is that during times of full
employment, the primary effect of government R&D programs is to
alter the composition of R&D rather than to increase the total. Without
serious attention to increasing the supply of R&D workers, government
R&D programs are not likely to solve the problem of general underin-
vestment in R&D by the private sector.
Reduced R&D profitability: The second cause of crowding out is that
federal R&D, if successful, may reduce the private returns to R&D ef-
fort and hence the propensity of the private sector to spend itsown
funds on R&D. If federal R&D increases overall R&D effort ina produc-
tive manner, the result will be greater innovation across the board in
the economy. Assuming that to some degree the products of federally
financed projects compete with the products of privately financed proj-
ects, the last dollar spent in the latter category will produce less profit
than it would have produced in the absence of the federal project. If
firms invest in R&D to the point at which the returns to the last dollar
equal the returns that are necessary to induce R&D investments,an
increase in federal R&D will cause an offsetting reduction in private
R&D.
Whether federal R&D is a substitute for private R&D dependson
the circumstances. The preceding argument is most relevant forpro-
grams that attempt to advance technology in a particular industry by
paying part of the cost of industry research consortia, such as the cre-
ation of Sematech to speed semiconductor development in the 1980s.'8
At the other extreme, the argument is least likely to apply to federal
support for R&D that is most likely to produce advancements in
knowledge that others will find easy to duplicate, and for fundamental
scientific knowledge that itself has no direct commercial use, but that
can be the basis for advances in commercial technologies and products.
Thus, the primary implication of this danger of crowding out is that70 Noll
federal R&D will be more productive if it focuses on areas where R&
D market failures are likely to be large.
Bureaucratic implementation: The last way in which crowding out can
occur is through the way that the government evaluates its own success
in R&D programs. A common method of evaluating a program is on
the basis of the commercially successful products that emanate from
it. In reviewing commercial R&D programs, Congressional overseers
frequently ask for examples of commercial successesnew products,
processes, and firms that have succeeded in the marketafter receiving
a federal R&D contract. The problemwith this approach is that it cre-
ates an incentive for agencies to sponsor the most commercially attrac-
tive projects the ones that industry on its own has the most incentive
to pursue. A study of the Small Business Innovative Research Program
found evidence that Congress evaluates the program in part on the
basis of examples of commercial successes, and that crowding did oc-
curfirms that received an SBIR grant appear to have reduced their
own R&D effort by approximately the sameamount.19 A less systematic
review of the Advanced Technology Program contains several state-
ments by industry and government officials that explicitlyevaluate
projects on the basis of commercial success, and others that express
concern that the program is not sufficiently focused onsolving market
failures rather than being associated with commercial successes.2°
This problem is similar to the previous source of crowding out in
that it involves government R&D support substituting for private in-
vestments, but the mechanism and its cause are different. In this case,
the problem arises from a propensity to pick projects on the basis of
their probability of commercial success, which than can lead to sup-
porting exactly the same work that the private sector would have been
most willing to support on its own. An important sourceof this prob-
lem is the difficulty in evaluating the success of an R&D program. To
do their jobs, Congress and the political appointees in the executive
must make budget allocations across competing programs on thebasis
of their effectiveness. Yet the effectiveness of R&D that is motivated
by the desire to improve commercial technology is difficult to measure
in any way other than whether the program led to innovations. Identi-
fying projects that are both commercially attractive and unlikely to be
supported by the private sector because they have high spillover bene-
fits requires far more information, technical knowledge, and effortthan
determining whether a project is likely to lead to a commercial
innovation.Federal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 71
A necessary action to ameliorate this problem is to invest adequate
resources in reviewing proposals and evaluating programs, as well as
a clear statement of a program's mandate that emphasizes creating
spillover benefits as opposed to commercial success. As a practical mat-
ter, programs have not been set up in this way, and evaluations of
commercially oriented R&D programs rarely address, let alone seri-
ously analyze, whether the program supports projects that solve spill-
over problems and complement the R&D efforts of firms in the
industry, rather than substitute for private support.
Summary on crowding out: Independent research on the effect of feder-
ally supported R&D generally concludes that crowding out is a serious
concern in two key respects. First, R&D policy needs to be paired with
educational policy, especially policy regarding higher education in
technical disciplines and math and science education in elementary and
high schools. At the national level, there is a serious question of
whether a large increase in federal R&D support during full employ-
ment will lead to more research. Second, programs that are designed to
advance commercial technologies in specific industries have not been
designed with sufficient precision to focus on projects with substantial
spillover benefits to members of society other than the firms that under-
take the project, rather than providing funds to successful commercial
ventures.
Distributive PoliticsAnother cautionary observation about federal
R&D programs pertains to the accuracy of the assumption that these
programs are designed and managed primarily to overcome market
failures in R&D. The foundation for this argument is that economic
inefficiency, per Se, does not translate into political action. Instead, pro-
grams are shaped by the pattern of support and opposition that they
engender among organized political constituencies.21 Elected officials
and civil servants, therefore, are likely to make decisions about the size
and scope of R&D programs on the basis of their effects on the key
interests that are likely to be affected by them, especially if those inter-
ests already are effective participants in the policymaking process. As
a result, the design of R&D programs is likely to give considerable
weight to the effect of a program on the distribution of wealth at the
expense of its effects on the rate of technological progress.
If policy tends to be biased towards advancing the interests of ex-
isting organized groups, one effect will be for government to avoid
projects that threaten an established industry, such as by providing72 No!!
funds to a startup or. a firm from outside an industry for an R&D project
that wou!d radically alter the industry's technology base. In this case,
government is more likely to support collaborative R&D that involves
most or even all of the firms in an industry, but in so doing risks reduc-
ing competition and overlooking the most promising radical ideas,
which historically have tended to come from outsiders. Another ex-
pected effect is that once a program has been initiated, killing it in the
face of poor performance will be more difficult than it would be if the
project were privately financed, because of the political significance of
the lost jobs and failed investments that would follow cancellation.
The desire to avoid killing projects leads to still another problem
the tendency to avoid using a portfolio of projects when the most prom-
ising path of technological innovation is uncertain. The advantage of
R&D competition among firms is that it provides a mechanism
whereby several attractive technological approaches can be tested si-
multaneously. But innovation competition leads to swings in the rela-
tive fortunes of firms within an industry, as has been apparent through
the history of the information technology sector since the invention of
the transistor. Because political officials have an incentive not to be
directly responsible for the failure of firms, they have an incentive to
avoid the portfolio approach because it will create losers. Indeed, two
government R&D programs that adopted the portfolio approach and
that, initially, were quite successful in the 1970s (broadcast satellites
and photovoltaic cells for electricity generation) were prematurely can-
celed when the technologies began to create losers.
The Net Value of Government R&D
Research on the benefits and costs of government R&D certainly cannot
provide a definitive conclusion on the overall net effect of these pro-
grams, but it has led to broad agreement on four points. First, govern-
ment R&D does have a potentially useful role in many areas, especially
in foundational research in science and engineering, where those who
discover new knowledge are not likely to capture much of its commer-
cial benefits. Second, abstracting from the additional problem of induc-
ing technological progress in industries that supply products for the
production of public goods (such as weapons systems and pollution
abatement devices), the private sector is not likely to make adequate
investments in R&D without support from the government. Third,Federal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 73
large-scale support for commercialization of new technologies in the
private sector is very likely to be inefficient because distributive politics
is likely to distort project choices. Fourth, crowding out is a concern
both for specific commercially significant projects and for the overall
level of R&D effort in society. An important component of policies to
ameliorate this problem is to expand the capacity of higher education
to produce scientists and engineers.
III.Trends in the Federal R&D Budget
This section examines the correspondence of the size and composition
of the federal R&D budget to ascertain the extent to which it reflects
the arguments of the preceding section. The issues to be addressed
are whether the pattern of expenditures is roughly consistent with the
market failure rationales for public support, and whether program im-
plementation leads to problems of crowding out and distributive poli-
tics. To address these issues, this section examines recent budget
initiatives in the context of the entire postwar history of federal R&D
policy.
Since the mid-1960s, federal R&D expenditures, after adjusting for
inflation, generally have been rising, but less rapidly than either private
R&D or the overall economy, as measured by the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). Table 3.1 shows several indicators of federal R&D effort,
broken down by defense and civilian (including space) programs. The
table organizes the data by presidential administration in order to dem-
onstrate the dominance of contemporary policy issues over partisan-
ship in the level and composition of federal R&D effort.
An important caveat to these data, and the analysis to follow, is that
the true effect of the Bush II administration on the R&D budget is still
highly uncertain. Due to the natural timing of the budget cycle, the
2003 budget is the first prepared in its entirety by the Bush II adminis-
tration. Moreover, this budget has yet to be reviewed and amended
by Congress, as it surely will be. For several years, Congress has appro-
priated substantially more money for R&D than the President has pro-
posed, so it can be misleading to compare past increases in spending
to the Administration's proposals for Fl 2003. Thus, the analysis to
follow should be interpreted as where the Bush II administration
would like to move federal R&D, and not necessarily as where it will
actually go.74 Noll
Table 3.1
R&D budgets by presidential administration
'These colunms are for calendar years, not fiscal years. Unfortunately, recent data on
private R&D are not available because the National Science Foundation did not complete
its biannual report on R&D, Science and Engineering Indicators, for 2002.
Includes some research programs outside the Department of Defense, most notably re-
search on nuclear weapons in the Department of Energy, but does not include space R&
D in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
CProposed
Sources: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2003: Historical Tables, Table 9,7, p. 171,
and National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2000, Appendix Table
2-19, p. A-48.
Defense-Related R&D
Federal R&D effort rose dramatically during the early years of the Cold
War. Defense R&D expenditures (including space-related spending)
roughly quadrupled during the ten-year period starting with the last
two years of the Truman administration arid continuing through the
Eisenhower administration, then stabilized at this higher level during
the Kennedy-Johnson administration. These increases reflected the
high R&D costs associated with the development of strategic defense
systems, nuclear weapons, and spacecraft. They also reflected a general
political optimism about the utility of R&D, even basic research, in
contributing to national security that reflected the success of military
R&D during World War II.
Midway into the Kennedy-Johnson years and persisting into the
Nixon administration, defense priorities shifted to conventional weap-
ons and military operations associated with the war in Southeast Asia.
Defense-related R&D peaked at $33.8 billion in 1996 dollars (1.2% of
Fiscal year
Federal R&D budget
In bil. 1996 $ As % of GDP As % of total R&Da
Defense" Other Defenseb Other Defens&' Other
1953 8.1 1.5 0.4 0.1 48.0 5.9
1961 30.9 8.3 1.3 0.4 50.4 14.8
1969 30.8 27.2 0.9 0.8 31.3 27.2
1977 24.4 23.7 0.6 0.5 25.8 25.2
1981 27.6 28.1 0.6 0.6 25.4 21.2
1989 48.7 24.6 0.7 0.4 27.9 14.7
1993 43.0 29.8 0.6 0.4 21.6 15.0
2001 44.3 34.7 0.5 0.4 NA NA
2003' 52.7 41.3 0.5 0.4 NA NAFederal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 75
GDP) in fiscal 1964, and then fell to $23.7 billion (0.6% of GDP) in 1976,
the last year of fighting in Vietnam.
With the end of the war, defense R&D began to increase as attention
focused on strategic weaponry associated with the Cold War, with the
increase modest during the Carter presidency and then much larger
during the Reagan administration. The big growth in defense R&D
took place between FY 1983 and FY 1986, when constant dollar expen-
ditures rose from $32.5 billion (0.6% of GDP) to $47.4 billion (0.8% of
GDP), an increase of nearly 50%.
From FY 1986 through FY 1990, defense R&D stabilized, but with
the fall of the Soviet Union and the new priorities occasioned by the
Gulf War, defense R&D again plummeted during the G. H. W. Bush
(Bush I) and Clinton presidencies, falling from a peak of $48.7 billion
in 1989 to $38.4 billion in FY 2000. As a fraction of GDP, defense R&
D peaked at 0.8% in FY 1988 and fell to 0.4% by FY 2000. The most
recent defense buildup began late in the Clinton administrationthe
last Clinton increase ($5.9 billion for FY 2001) actually exceeded the
first increase of the Bush II administration ($4.3 billion for FY 2002)
and the proposed increase for FY 2003 ($4.1 billion).
The last fifty years provide some interesting perspectives on defense
R&D. Despite the rhetoric of partisan politics, R&D spending really
does not reveal a clear partisan effect.23 Defense R&D effort is sup-
ported by presidents of both parties when an external military threat
is salient but the nation is not deeply occupied with fighting a conven-
tional war.
The two major recent growth spurts in defense R&D (1983-1986 and
2000-2003), while substantial, pale in comparison with the increases
during the late Truman, Eisenhower, and early Kennedy presidencies.
At its peak, defense R&D in the Reagan era accounted for a much lower
percentage of GDP than it did during the Truman-Eisenhower-Ken-
nedy period (0.8% vs. 1.3% in 1960 and 1.2% in 1964), and the change
in this percentage during the later buildup also was far less (a growth
of 0.3% of GDP under Carter and Reagan vs. a growth of 1.0% under
Truman and Eisenhower that was maintained by Kennedy and John-
son until 1965). Finally, although the Clinton-Bush II increase in de-
fense R&D has not yet run its course, it thus far has increased the
percentage of GDP devoted to defense R&D by slightly less than 0.2
percentage points. The budget proposals for 2003 do not reflect the
mobilization rhetoric of the war on terrorism.76 Noll
Federal Nondefense R&D
In elementary economics textbooks, a conventional illustration of the
principle of tradeoffs is the "guns or butter" metaphor: a nation's pro-
duction can be imagined as requiring a sacrifice of consumer goods
(e.g., butter) in order to obtain more national security (e.g., guns).
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century and persisting
through the FY 2003 budget of the Bush II administration, no such
trade-off is apparent for R&D. In general, when defense R&D rises (or
falls), so does nondefense R&D, although often one leads the other by
a few years.
For example, during the defense R&D boom of the 1950s, the Truman
and Eisenhower Administrations increased the percentage of GDP de-
voted to defense R&D from 0.3% in FY 1951 to 1.1% in FY 1961. In this
case, a large increase in non-defense R&D (from 1.0 to 1.6 billion 1996
dollars) took place first, in FY 1950. Civilian R&D then stabilized at
roughly 0.1% of GDP until the second half of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration, when it rose to $8.3 billion (0.4% of GDP) by 1961. This growth
in nondefense R&D continued until late in the Johnson administration,
when it fell victim to the war in Vietnam, falling in FY 1967 and in
nearly every year thereafter for a decade.
The only period in which federal defense and civilian R&D expendi-
tures went in opposite directions for several years was during the
Reagan and Bush I presidencies. Reagan clearly substituted defense
R&D for other R&D, but the cuts in non defense R&D under Reagan
were restored under Bush I, who cut defense R&D by a roughly the
same amount as he increased civilian R&D. Nevertheless, together
these two administrations actually increased both types of R&D pro-
grams, although the increase in defense was much larger. The Clinton
Administration cut overall R&D spending in its early years when bal-
ancing the budget was its main priority, and then, in later years, as
surpluses developed, substantially increased both defense and nonde-
fense R&D. Finally, the Bush II administration has supported increases
in both defense and rondefense R&D.
The Composition of Federal R&D
The composition of the federal budget provides information not only
about the substantive priorities of the government, but also about the
extent to which expenditures match the market failure arguments forFederal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 77
Table 3.2
Composition of federal R&D budget
Percent of R&D Expenditures for:
Science
YearDefense Space & eng. Energy Transport Health Agriculture Resources Other
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal 2003: Historical Tables, Table 9.8, pp. 172-
178.
*less than 1%.
federal support. Table 3.2 provides the percentage breakdown of fed-
eral expenditures by broad functional categories for the past fifty years.
Defense and Ant iterrorismAs the table shows, most federal R&D
money always has been spent on defense. The market failure rationale
is consistent with a substantial federal presence in defense R&D. Since
the Kennedy administration, every administration except that of Ron-
ald Reagan has spent between 50% and 60% of the R&D budget on
defense. The Reagan administration clearly differed from the rest, be-
fore or since, as defense R&D peaked at 69% of the federal R&D budget
in fiscal 1986, a level that had not been exceeded since the Eisenhower
era. Of the fall of the defense proportion by 13 percentage points since
1986, 3 points took place during the last years of the Reagan Adminis-
tration, 7 points during the Bush I Administration, 3 additional points
during the Clinton administration, and, as yet, none during the Bush
II administration.
The antiterrorism initiative is an example of the defense procurement
market failure rationale for. government R&D in two respects. First,
some R&D pertaining to antiterrorism focuses on technologies for
which government would constitute most, if not all, of the demand.
One example is antidotes for bioterroism, for which a large part of
the demand is for military and emergency relief personnel. With the
federalization of airport security, another example is technology for
1953 84 3 3 * 2 3 2 3
1961 79 7 3 2 2 4 1 1 1
1969 53 26 4 3 2 7 1 1 2
1977 51 16 4 10 3 8 2 3 3
1981 50 14 4 11 3 12 2 3 2
1989 66 7 4 4 2 12 1 2 1
1993 59 10 4 4 2 15 2 3 2
2001 56 7 6 2 2 23 2 2 2
2003P56 6 5 1 2 24 2 2 278 Noll
detecting weapons hidden on passengers and in luggage. Second, strat-
egies to protect against terrorism provide a public goodthat is, the
beneficiaries include a much larger universe of people than the iridus-
tries, such as airlines, that might be the target of an attack.
The primary issue raised by the antiterrorism initiative is whether
it is likely to involve a significant amount of R&D. The FY 2003 budget
contains strong references to antiterrorism as a motive for reallocating
research priorities, but only as a possible future priority. "Potential
antiterrorism R&D applications span a wide range, including safe-
guarding the mail, developing new vaccines and air safety systems,
and creating advanced materials and enhanced building designs.
Often, the scientific community will be asked to devise solutions in
cost-effective ways that do not impinge on our way of life."24 The bud-
get goes on to report the creation of an interagency committee "to de-
velop a coordinated interagency R&D plan for antiterrorism."
Nevertheless, whether the antiterrorism campaign is likely to in-
volve substantial R&D activity remains uncertain. The budget asks for
$2.4 billion for R&D associated with antiterrorism.26 Among the new
initiatives, the budget lists $1.75 billion for bioterrorism research in
the National Institutes of Health,27 $420 million for the Department of
Defense for threat detection, protective gear, vaccines, long-range sur-
veillance to detect the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, and
"hard target" munitions,28 and unspecified sums for the Department
of Transportation for airline security.29
The gross expenditures on these items substantially exceed the in-
crease in net spending. Research on improving airline security systems
and detecting and treating anthrax and other possible biological war-
fare agents has been under way for a long time. The most recent R&
D budget analysis for the American Association for the Advancement
of Science estimates that the antiterrorism R&D budget was about $900
million in FY2001 and $1.5 billion in FY 2002,° indicating that the net
increase occasioned by 9 / 11 was at most $1.5 billion. Moreover, even
the gross FY 2003 proposal is small compared to the total budget for
R&D (about 2%) and even compared to spending on health R&D (about
10%). Thus, as yet the antiterrorist initiative contains relatively few dol-
lars, and does not appear likely to be more than a small component of
the general trend towards increased defense R&D that has been appar-
ent for several years.
The defense R&D budget contains substantial expenditures to sup-
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sively by the Department of Defense (DOD). Muchof this work is
targeted at either the aerospace industry or the informationtechnology
sector. For example, programs to develophigh-speed orbital aircraft
and to advance integrated circuit technology werefinanced by DOD.
These activities are not clearly justified by therationale that the govern-
ment is the sole or major source of demandfor them, but instead are
more closely tied to the rationalethat generally the private sector will
underinvest in R&D.
Fundamental ResearchThe market failure theory is consistent with
substantial spending on fundamental research in scienceand engi-
neering. In table 3.2, these expenditures arecontained primarily under
the heading "Science and engineering." Thisheading contains the R&
D budgets of the National Science Foundation(NSF) and the general
nuclear science component of the Departmentof Energy (DOE), which
is dominated by research in the nation'sparticle accelerator facilities.
The NSF research support budget has been increasing morerapidly
than the rate of inflation since fiscal 1997, and has grownfrom $2.57
billion to a proposed $3.09 billion (nominaldollars) in the past two
years. The nuclear sciencebudget in DOE tripled during the last few
years of the Clinton administration,and is proposed to grow from $2.29
billion in FY 2001 to $2.49 billion in FY 2003, which isslightly faster
than inflation.31
Fundamental research is contained in the other categories,especially
space, energy, and health.NASA includes a significant budget for
space and earth sciences,which covers research conducted on various
spacecraft as well as other fundamental research that isrelated to the
development of space transportation, includingbiology in the space
environment. Together these programs areproposed to grow from
$4.75 billion in FY 2001 to $5.92 billion in FY 2003.The Department of
Energy supports research in all sciencesand engineering that pertains
to energy sources other than nuclear,and the total DOE proposed bud-
get for science and technology in FY2003is $3.29 billionabout $800
million more than the nuclear researchprogram.32
The health R&D budget includes a very largeexpenditure on basic
research in molecular biology by the National Institutesof Health. Both
the Clinton and Bush II administrations havebeen extremely generous
with NIH, together doubling the NIH budget in five yearsbetween FY
1998 and FY 2003, with the last step a proposed increaseof $2.9 billion
to $24.1 billion.3380 Noll
With the exception of NIH, the budget for fundamental research has
accounted for a relatively stable share of federal R&D for the entire
period. Health research has been the fastest-growingpart of the R&D
budget, and is the only component that is expected to increaseits share
of overall spending in the proposed fiscal 2003 budget. Between fiscal
2001 and the proposed FY 2003 budget, R&D expenditures increase by
$20.5 billion, and of this $11.5 billion is for defense and $6.5 billion for
health, leaving only an increase of $2.5 billion for everythingelse
which is insufficient to keep up with inflation.
This pattern of R&D expenditures closely parallels thecomposition
of changes in the R&D budget during the second term of the Clinton
administration, in which total R&D expendituresrose by $15.3 billion,
with increases of $8.2 billion for defense and another $8.2 billion for
health. Space, energy, and transportation all suffered major budgetcuts
during this period, while science and engineering increased by$2.1
billion. The Bush II administration's FY 2003 budget seeksto restore
only a small proportion of these cuts.
The budget allocations for fundamental science and engineering dur-
ing the past fifty years raise the issue of whether the steadyincrease
in biomedical research is justified. Usually the criticism of the growth
in the share of health in overall R&D takes the form ofquestioning
whether the budget is "balanced"that is, whether it is efficiently
spread among areas of research by discipline, appliedvs. fundamental,
and areas of potential applications. The mostcommon specific com-
plaint is that the federal government has given insufficientattention
to information technology and the fields of science and engineering
that support it, while some scientists also complain that thegovern-
ment is too concerned about identifying specific applications that
might arise from basic research and insufficiently excited about simply
advancing human understanding of the natural world. In reality,these
complaints do not appear to be generally valid, butsome elements of
the balance issue are genuine concerns.
The federal government has played a major role in both fundamental
and applied research for four major sectors of theeconomy: biotechnol-
ogy (primarily through NIH, although historically through the Depart-
ment of Agriculture), aerospace (primarily through DOD and NASA),
energy (primarily through DOE), and information technology (pri-
marily through DOD and NSF). In eacharea other than biotechnology,
the long-term changes in the level of federal R&Dsupport are
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The importance of aerospace has been diminished by the end of the
Cold War, and the industry has shrunk dramatically. While one can
debate exactly how much aerospace R&D ought to shrink, giventhe
radical change that has occurred in international relations,the reduc-
tion that has occurred is within the range of defensible outcomes.After
suffering a substantial decline at the end of the Cold War, supportfor
defense-related research in information technology has recovered. Be-
cause of the importance of informationtechnology in advanced weap-
ons systems, substantial supportfrom the Department of Defense for
R&D is a reasonable consequence of the largerdecision to pursue
"smart" weapons for conventional warfare.
Support for fundamental research that is related to nuclear energy
(mainly, support for particle accelerators) always has had a tenuous
connection to applications, and after years of ups and downs, appears
to be rising again. This research is very expensive,and particle accelera-
tors have some important applications, but itsjustification depends
mainly on the kind of knowledge it creates. Accelerator research at-
tacks the most fundamental questions of all about the natureand ori-
gins of matter, and as a result advances in this area receiveconsiderable
public attention, and certainly among scientists bring greatprofes-
sional prestige. Because of the peculiar nature and value of this work,
it is difficult to make a strong case in favor of a majorchange in the
budget in either direction. Thus, the "imbalances" that havedeveloped
in the past few years through changes in the pattern ofexpenditures
outside of the health area, while controversial, are not irrational.
Nevertheless, the balance debate reflects a valid concern: whether
the explosive growth in biomedical research is justified. Thegrowth in
biotechnology R&D related to health raises an important issuewith
respect to crowding out: is the rapid growth in this areacausing in-
creased R&D effort, or is it simply driving up the cost of biomedical
professionals, including clinical physicians on the boundary between
research and practice? Likewise, is this R&D producing health benefits
that are proportional to its growing cost, or is it mostly yielding new
medical technologies with high costs and low benefits? To myknowl-
edge, the research on R&D provides no definitive answer tothese ques-
tions. One relevant fact is that the number ofbiomedical researchers
associated with universities has grown rapidly while the numbers of
other science and engineering researchers and clinical physicians
in general practice are stable or declining. Another is thathealth care
expenditures have been growing very rapidly for forty yearswhile82 Noll
mortality and morbidity have not been significantly reduced formore
than a few diseases. These broad trends are enough to justifya more
serious investigation of whether the growth in biomedical research is
mainly causing a substitution of effort in favor of research witha low
social payoff and inflation in both biomedical R&D and healthcare
costs.
Another important issue with respect to fundamental research is its
apparently growing tendency to be affected by distributive politics.
Most federal expenditures on fundamental researchgo to universities.
Historically, the preferred method for picking university research proj-
ects was the system of peer review, in which researchers in a field eval-
uate research proposals and agencies generally support the projects
with the most favorable reviews. In recent years a rapidly growing
pool of research money has been earmarked for specific projects and
specific institutions.34 Between 1996 and 2001, the amount of academic
earmarks in the final budget passed by Congressrose from $296 million
to $1.668 billion, and the fraction of Federal expenditures on research
at colleges and universities that was accounted for by earmarksrose
from 2.5% to 94%35 Interestingly, academic earmarks account fora
very large proportion of federal R&D that is directed at a particular
external performing institution. In FY 2001 the total amount spenton
earmarked projects was $1.766 bjllion, leaving only about $100 million
outside of academia. With few exceptions, the earmarked projectsare
for institutions that are not highly regarded as either educationalor
research institutions.36
Support for Commercial Applications R&D performed by industryexpe-
rienced substantial growth in the 1990s, roughly doubling between
1992 (the end of one recession) and 2001 (the beginning of the next
recession); however, as is normal during a recession, real R&D spend-
ing by industry declined slightly between 2001 and 2002, and isex-
pected to do so again in 2003.
Support for industry R&D takes two forms. One is generalsupport
that is not aimed directly at a specific firm or industry, and the other is
targeted support that takes the form of contracts with firmsor industry
consortia to undertake R&D.
The two leading examples of general supportare fundamental re-
search and the R&D tax credit. One stated motive for Federal support
for fundamental research in science and engineering is to createoppor-
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taken in universities, nonprofit research institutions, or government
laboratories without any involvement by, or even specific application
for, an industrial group. The R&D tax credit provides tax relief tofirms
that increase their R&D spending, and so provides indirectsubsidies
for R&D among firms that are profitable and so can use the taxcredit.
The evidence indicates that this tax credit has had a modest but signifi-
cant effect on industrial R&D.38
As is apparent from the rest of the entries in the table, the presence
of the federal government in R&D that focuses on specificindustries
and technologies other than health and defense is extremelylimited.
Two temporary surges in other types of targeted R&D expenditures
have taken place: space and energy. The boom in the space program
reflected the 1960s race to the moon and the 1970s development of the
Space Shuttle. At the time of the moon landings, space accountedfor
about one-fourth of federal R&D, but since then has steadilyfallen to
the proposed 6% in FY 2003. The other temporary boom occurredin
the 1970s for R&D on energy technologies in response to the two oil
crises of 1972-1973 and 1979-1980. Federal support for research on
energy technologies exceeded 10% percentof federal R&D at its peak
in the early 1980s; however, it now accounts for onlyabout 1%.
Across all agencies and categories, about a third of the R&D budget
is spent through contracts with industry, most of which isaccounted
for by defense. Less than 15% of R&D performed by industry ispaid
for by the federal government.39 Thus, in an economy that spends over
$200 billion on R&D, only a few billion consists of targetedsubsidies
to deal with the general propensity of the private sector tounderinvest
in R&D outside of defense. Hence, it is reasonable toconclude that this
particular market failure has not motivated much of a policy response,
and that outside of academia and defense, the distributive politics mo-
tive for R&D spending does not have much of an effect onthe alloca-
tion of R&D resources.
During the 1980s, a modest boom took place in programs in which
the federal government directly supported a large number of commer-
cial R&D projects, sometimes in industrial laboratories and sometimes
in collaborations between federal and industrial researchers.Examples
including the Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
(CRADAs) between Federal labs and industry, the Advanced Technol-
ogy Program (ATP) in the NationalInstitutes for Science and Technol-
ogy in the Department of Commerce,and support for industry-wide
R&D consortia, such as Sematech for the semiconductor industry.84 Noll
During the Clinton Administration, these programs generallyexpe-
rienced declining budgets and had mostly disappeared by the time the
Bush II administration took office. For the most part, this category of
programs is regarded as having at best mixed success, with the major
problems being its susceptibility to pork barrel politics and the diffi-
culties facing agencies in identifying projects that deserve federal
support.
The FY 2003 budget proposal calls for the virtual dismantling of ATP.
The new spending authority for ATP is proposed to be cut fromover
$100 million to $35 million. Because this program has been popular
with Congress and is regarded as the best-designed of the various pro-
grams for supporting commercial R&D, this proposal may not be ac-
cepted by Congress.
R&D-Related EducationSupport for education in science and engi-
neering fields can increase overall R&D and reduce the extent to which
federal R&D causes crowding out of private R&D. The FY 2003 budget
proposals provide for an increase in federal spendingon education,
including spending on mathematics and science in elementary andsec-
ondary schools and on support for college students, both generally and
in science and engineering.40 Whereas these increases are consistent
with the argument in favor of subsidizing R&D by subsidizing the edu-
cation of those who perform it, they amount to very little of the total
spending for education. Federal expenditures account for only 7.9% of
elementary and secondary education, and while the proportion is
much larger for higher education, almost all of the latter is accounted
for by Pell grants (proposed to total $10.9 billion in FY 2003), which
provide financial support to students from low-income families regard-
less of their field of study.4'
To change significantly the pattern of enrollments in higher educa-
tion would require two major changes in federal policy. First, federal
support would have to differentiate among students according to their
field of study, providing greater support for students in science and
engineering than for students pursuing other majors. Second, the addi-
tional support would need to be channeled towards increasingexpen-
ditures by institutions of higher education in these fields of study,
either by introducing differential tuition rates or by providing grants
to subsidize faculty, classrooms, laboratories, and other educational in-
puts in technical disciplines. The budget does not mention, let alone
seriously contemplate, any such changes.Federal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 85
Conclusions
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that thereduction in
federal R&D occasioned by the end of the Cold War appears to have
come to an end. Both defense andnondefense R&D are once again
growing. Moreover, despite the political rhetoric, this trend seems to
have virtually nothing to do with the new war on terrorism.The
growth in R&D spending began several years ago, and as yet the events
of the fall of 2001 have had almost no effect on the compositionof the
federal R&D budget.
If an antiterrorism effect does arise, the effect may well be negative
rather than positive. If (as thus far seems likely) the response to ter-
rorism does not have a substantial, across-the-board R&D compo-
nent, then the main effect of the war on terrorism willbe increases in
conventional budgetary line items. If these become large, the circum-
stance will come to resemble the budgetary environmentduring the
war in Vietnam, when all formsof R&D spending took cuts. But for
this to be the case, antiterrorism policy must have a major,durable
effect on the budget, which, to date at least, does not appear to be the
case.
Criticisms of the balance in the composition of the budget appear to
be overdrawn. In reality, the relative emphases onfundamental vs.
applied, and among areas of research, do not seem to have changed a
great deal through several administrations. If one criticizesthe Bush
II administration for an overemphasis on biotechnologyand defense,
one must also level that criticism at everyadministration since Car-
terwith the exception of Bush I.
The federal government's priorities do not perfectly trackthose
that would be derived from the basic economics of R&D, butthey are
not wildly inconsistent, either. While the correctmagnitude of support
for fundamental research and defense R&D is surely debatable, the
historical emphasis on these areas is based on valid arguments about
failures in the market for R&D. The relative paucity of appliedresearch
to support commercial technologies in most other areas isnot consis-
tent with the argument that the private sector islikely to underinvest
in R&D; however, the problems with regard topolitical distortions in
targeted subsidies for industry weaken the case for a majorfederal
role.
Indeed, the primary problem with existing federal R&D programs
probably is distortions arising from distributive politics, as witnessed86 Noll
most recently by earmarking for university research projects. But while
this specific example is new, it is hardly exceptional. Distributive
politics has interfered with the efficient implementation of federal
R&D for a very long time. One might rephrase the issue as why Con-
gress took so long to do to university research what it has been doing
to many other programs (not just other R&D) for decades.
Notes
0MB (2002), Chapter 8, "Research and Development," pp. 159, 163.
Ibid., "Protecting the Homeland," pp. 15-24, and "Wing the War Against Terror-
ism Abroad," pp. 25-30.
Ibid., p. 159. The budget does not state the magnitude of either the level or the change
in expenditures that focus on antiterrorism and homeland security, although, as dis-
cussed elsewhere in this paper, it gives a few concrete examples.
This section summarizes a very large literature that has become part of the modern
economics canon. For a more complete statement, see Cohen and Noll (1991, chapters
1, 2).
See, for example, Denison (1985) and Lau (1996). Lau also finds that technological
progress apparently has played virtually no role in economic growth in developing coun-
tries and the newly industrializing nations of the Far East.
For example, see Monteverde and Teece (1982).
For a summary of this research, see Griliches (1992).
The U.S. government, too, will have too little incentive to pursue R&D to the extend
that other nations derive benefits from U.S. R&D effort; however, the extent of underin-
vestment will be lowest for the U.S. federal government among all governmental sources
of R&D. The reason is that the largest single economic unit in the world is the U.S., so
it faces less disincentive from spillover benefits than any other government.
See Lerner (1999).
An attraction of incentive methods of pollution abatement, such as emissions taxes
and tradable emissions permits, is that they do create an incentive to advance abatement
technology. However, most environmental and safety problems make little or no use of
incentives, relying almost exclusively on traditional regulatory standards.
See Hall, Toole, and David (2000).
See Goolsbee (1998).
See Burtless and Noll (1998, pp. 63-85).
Ibid., pp. 73-81.
See Noll (1998).
See California Council (1999) and Cohen and NoB (1998).Federal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 87
See Romer (2000).
For a discussion of how federally-supported industry consortia can reduce overall
R&D effort and slow economic growth, see Cohen and Noll (1994).
See Wallsten (2000).
See Wessner (1999).
For a more complete development of this argument, see Cohen and Noll (1991,
Chapter 4).
See Cohen and Noll (1991, chapters 7, 11).
A table organized to reflect the partisan composition of Congress would not change
this conclusion, although the evidence is less interesting because of the greater domi-
nance of Democrats in Congress. Republicans controlled bothhouses of Congress only
during the last six years of the Clinton Administration, when both defense and civilian
R&D increased. The massive increase in defense coupled with a fall in civilian R&D
under Reagan took place when the Republicans controlled the Senate but the Democrats
controlled the House, and the recent increase in both types of R&D supported by the
Bush II administration also is taking place in a period in which the partisan control of
Congress is divided. In all other periods, both houses of Congress were controlled by
Democrats.
See 0MB (2002, p. 164).
Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 165. Most of this proposed increase is for the development of diagnostics
and treatments for biological warfare agents, but a small amount is for improving labora-
tories coping with biological or chemical incidents (p. 19).
Ibid., pp. 19, 166-167.
Ibid., p. 168.
See Flanagan and Turner (2002).
Historical Tables, 0MB (2002, p. 178).
Ibid., p. 136.
Historical Tables, Ibid., p. 178. New obligation authority is proposed to increase even
more, by $3.9 billion, to $27.2 billion (ibid., p. 143).
For a detailed description of the growth of the "academic pork barrel," see Savage
(1999).
See 0MB (2002, p. 162).
Ibid., p. 174.
See Armbrecht (2002).
See Hall and van Reenan (2000).
See National Science Foundation (2000), p. A-23.88 Noll
The overall increase in support for science and engineering education at colleges
and universities also reflects a considerable shift in the allocation of this support among
agencies, with NIH and NSF receiving large increases and other agencies experiencing
large cuts. For a more complete discussion of the education budget, see Jesse (2002).
thid., pp. 43, 46.
References
Armbrecht, F. M. Ross, Jr., "R&D and Innovation in Industry." In Research and Develop-
ment FY 2002: AAAS Report XXVII. American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence: 36.
Burtless, Gary, and Roger C. Noll. 1998. "Students and Research Universities." In Roger
C. Noll, ed., Challenges to Research Universities. Brookings Institution.
California Council on Science and Technology. 1999. California Report on the Environment
for Science and Technology.
Cohen, Linda R., and Roger C. Noll. 1991. The Technology Pork Barrel. Brookings Institu-
tion.
Cohen, Linda R., and Roger C. Noll. 1994. "Privatizing Public Research." Scientific Ameri-
can 271(3): 72-77.
Cohen, Linda R., and Roger C. Noll. 1998. "Universities, Constituencies, and the Role
of the Staters." In Roger C. Noll, ed., Challenges to Research Universities. Brookings Institu-
tion: 31-62.
Denison, Edward F. 1985. Trends in American Economic Growth. Brookings Institution.
Flanagan, Elizabeth M., and Paul W. Turner. 2002. "Political and Policy Context of the
FY 2003 Budget." In Research and Development FY 2003: AAAS Report XX VII. American
Association for the Advancement of Science: 21-22.
Goolesbee, Austan. May 1998. "Does R&D Policy Primarily Benefit Scientists and Engi-
neers?" American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 88(2): 298-302.
Griiches, Zvi. 1992. "The Search for R&D Spillovers." Scandanavian Journal of Economics
94: 29-47.
Hall, Bronwyn H., Andrew A. Toole, and Paul A. David. 2000. "Is Public R&D a Comple-
ment or Substitute for Private R&D? A New Review of the Evidence." Research Policy
29: 497-529.
Hall, Bronwyn H., and John van Reenan. 2000. "How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives for
R&D? A New Review of the Evidence." Research Policy 29: 449-469.
Jesse, Jolene Kay, "Education and Human Resources in the FY 2003 Budget." 2002. In
Research and Development FY 2003: AAAS Report XXVII. American Association for the
Advancement of Science: 43-51.
Lau, Lawrence J. 1996. "The Sources of Long-Term Economic Growth: Observations from
the Experience of Developed and Developing Countries." In Ralph Landau, Timothy
Taylor, and Gavin Wright, eds., The Mosaic of Economic Growth. Stanford University Press:
63-91.Federal R&D in the Antiterrorist Era 89
Lerner, Josh. 1999. "The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Impact of the
SBIR Program." Journal of Business 72(July): 285-318.
Monteverde, Kirk, and David Teece. 1982. "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Inte-
gration in the U.S. Automobile Industry." Bell Journal of Economics 13: 206-213.
National Science Foundation 2000. Science and Engineering Indicators 2000.
Noll, Roger G. 1998. "The American Research University: An Introduction." In Roger
C. Noll, ed., Challenges to Research Universities. Brookings Institution: 1-30.
Office Management and Budget. 2002. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2003.
Romer, Paul. 2000. "Should the Government Subsidize Supply or Demand in the Market
for Scientists and Engineers?" In Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, and Scott Stern, eds., Innova-
tion Policy and the Economy, volume 1. The MIT Press: 221-252.
Savage, James D. 1999. Funding Science in America. Cambridge University Press.
Wallsten, Scott J. 2000. "The Effects of Government-Industry R&D Programs on Private
R&D: The Case of the Small Business Innovative Research Program." Rand Journal of
Economics 31(Spring): 82-100.
Wessner, Charles W. ed. 1999. The Advanced Technology Program: Challenges and Opportuni-
ties. National Research Council.